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The Implications of In re L.M. T.: A Call to the
North Carolina General Assembly to Reinstate
Procedural Safeguards, a Parent's Right to
Appeal, and the Importance of a Permanency
Planning Order
ABSTRACT
Jane Smith' had finally gotten her life back on track. Jane, a mother of
two, had a checkered past of drug addiction andfailure to properly care
for her children. After a teacher reported suspicion of child neglect to the
local Department of Social Services (DSS), DSS began an investigation of
Jane and her two children. At the first hearing, the judge adjudicated the
children "neglected" and ordered the children be placed in nonsecure
custody. While the children were in nonsecure custody, the court and DSS
planned to reuniteJane with her two children and maintain thefamily unit.
Eight months later, Jane and her lawyer believed she had made the
requiredreasonable efforts to regainfull custody of her children and avoid
a cease reunificationefforts order. Jane attended drug counseling classes,
parenting classes, and sought full-time employment, but the court decided
that reunification between Jane and her children was not the best course of
action and entered an order ceasing reunification efforts between Jane and
her children. The court cited what it found to be a lack of reasonable
efforts made by Jane. Jane, trying to regainfull custody of her children,
filed a motion to appeal the cease reunification order on the grounds that
the court lacked sufficient findings of fact to show that reunification
between Jane and her children would befutile.4 Jane believed the deficient
cease reunification order meant she could continue on the permanency
planning track and eventually regain custody of her children.
Following the order to cease reunification efforts and Jane's appeal, DSS
motioned for a termination of parental rights. Accordingly, the court
1.
2.
3.
4.

Jane Smith is a pseudonym used for the purposes of the hypothetical.
See infra Part I-B-ii.
See infra Part 1-B-iii and iv.
See id.
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entered a termination ofparentalrights order. The termination ofparental
rights order completely severed the relationship between Jane and her
children.
On appeal, the appellate court agreed that the cease reunification order
was deficient and did not include the requiredfindings of fact showing
reunification efforts would be futile. The court stated that, on its own
standing, the cease reunification order incorrectly characterizedJane's
reasonable efforts. The appellate court held that Jane's participationin
drug counseling classes and parentingclasses was proof of her reasonable
efforts to regain custody. Despitefinding the order deficient, the appellate
court upheld the trial court's permanency planning order because the
missing findings of fact were provided by the subsequent termination of
parentalrights order. Relying on In re L.M.T., A.M.T., the court read the
subsequent termination of parental rights order in conjunction with the
The holding from L.M.T. allowed a
permanency planning order.6
subsequent termination ofparentalrights order to "cure" a prior, deficient
order.' Therefore, although Jane had a basisfor appealingfrom the cease
reunification order, her appeal was moot when the court later made the
requiredfindings in the subsequent, separate order. Thus, Jane lost her
appealand her relationshipwith her children wasforever severed.
INTRODUCTION

The North Carolina Supreme Court recently addressed the relationship
between permanency planning orders and termination of parental rights
orders in In re L.MT.8 The majority opinion held a subsequent order
terminating the parental rights can cure a prior, deficient permanency
planning order. 9 However, the concurring opinion disagreed with the
reading of the permanency planning order and termination of parental
rights order together.o
If deficiencies in a permanency planning order can be cured by a
termination of parental rights order, the two orders are essentially merged

5. See infra Part I-B-v.
6. In re L.M.T., A.M.T., 752 S.E.2d 453, 454 (N.C. 2013).
7. Id. at 454.
8. See id.
9. Id at 456-57.
10. Id at 461-62 (Beasley, J., concurring) ("I further disagree with the majority's
merging of permanency planning and termination orders for purposes of appellate review.
Underlying my disagreement is the fact that permanency planning hearings are
fundamentally different in nature than proceedings to terminate parental rights.").
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into one order when reviewed by appellate courts.' 1 The merging of the
two orders is problematic because that method exposes the parent to
procedural vulnerability, abridges a parent's right to appeal, and
undermines the importance and role of a permanency planning order.
This Comment explores the implications of the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in In re L.M T. It discusses the conflicting
interests of (1) the constitutional right to parent without federal or state
interference and (2) the desire to remove children from detrimental
environments, as authorized by the state acting under the parens patriael2
policy. Part I discusses the procedure of removing children from their
parental homes, the subsequent court hearings and orders, and the
repercussions of said orders. Part II outlines the rationale behind the
holding of In re L.M T Part III outlines the implications from said holding.
Part IV challenges the North Carolina General Assembly to better protect a
parent's right to appeal. Particularly, this Comment urges the General
Assembly to revise General Statute section 7B-1001(a)(5)(a) and, in effect,
to supersede the holding in L.M. T
I. THE LAW AND THE CROSSROADS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PARENT AND THE PROCESS OF REMOVING CHILDREN FROM INJURIOUS
HOMES

A. The ConstitutionalRight to Parentand GovernmentalInterference with
that Right
Common law tradition recognizes parents as the ultimate caretakers of
their children,' 3 but this significant right is also embedded in the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in order to

11. Id. at 456-57.
12. Parenspatriae, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("[Latin 'parent of his

or her country'] .... 2. The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as
provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves .... 3. A doctrine by which a
government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of
someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit. . . .").
13. See generally e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); see also I N.C. Div. oF Soc. SERVS., FAMILY SERVICES MANUAL Ch. VIII

(2009), http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/pdf%/20docs/CS1412.pdf
[https://perma.cclU5Z8-CEVM].
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protect the family unit. 14 The right to parent is closely guarded by the
Constitution because that right is considered a fundamental privacy right.15
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has specifically stated the right of
a parent is a "right[] far more precious . . . than property rights." 1 6 This
sentiment was explicitly adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
In re Oghenekevebe.' 7 Thus, the family unit is generally protected from
federal or state intervention. 18
The constitutional right to parent includes certain duties to provide for
the wellbeing of a child, while giving parents power to make decisions
about the ways in which their child will be raised. 19 Parents are responsible
for providing food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, among other needs
for their children. 2 0 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
reaffirms "that a parent enjoys a fundamental right 'to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control' of his or her children .. .,,2 1
Though paramount, the right to parent is not without its limitations.
Although there is a presumption that a parent will act in the best interest of
the child, sadly, that is not always the case.2 2 Therefore, each state has a

14. See Adams v. Tessener, 550 S.E.2d 499, 501 (N.C. 2001) (citing Petersen v.
Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901, 903 (N.C. 1994)); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 531 (N.C.
1997) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent
and child is constitutionally protected." (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978))).
15. See LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-40 ("This Court has long recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 845
("[T]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be
sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in 'this
Nation's history and tradition."' (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503));
KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, FAMILY LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 100
(2009) ("[T]he Constitution protects parental liberty not so much because that liberty is
good for parents but because key aspects of individualistic American culture will be
undermined if the state asserts too much control over how children are to be raised.").
16. Petersen, 445 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
17. In re Oghenekevebe, 473 S.E.2d 393, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("This Court has
previously recognized that a parent's interest in his or her child is 'more precious than any
property right."' (quoting In re Murphy, 414 S.E.2d 396, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)), aff'd,
422 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1992)).
18. See BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 101.
19. See Tessener, 550 S.E.2d at 502.
20. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2
(2014), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7DJ-GZFD].
21. Tessener, 550 S.E.2d at 501 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
22. See e.g., Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C. 1997) (citing Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983)); In re Hughes, 119 S.E.2d 180, 189 (N.C. 1961).
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statute that empowers the state to override parental authority. 23
Specifically in North Carolina, members of the legislature "ha[ve] clearly
expressed their desire to ensure that children receive that 'degree of care
which promotes [their] healthy and orderly physical and emotional
well-being."' 2 4 Accordingly, when questions of adequate care come before
the courts, the inquiry is not whether a third party could make a better
25
decision. Likewise, the question is not if a third party "can give the child
In
better care and greater comforts and protection than the parent ....
fact, in some instances, a parent's decision for his or her child may be
contradictory to a state's laws enacted through its general police power.2 7
Instead, the question for the courts is whether the parent adequately cares
for his or her child.2 8 Thus, when a parent or guardian fails to provide
adequate care, the state may limit parental rights. 29
The movement to protect children who are neglected, abused, and/or
dependent 3 0 began in the late nineteenth century.31 Now, every state has at
least one statute aimed at protecting children from abuse or neglect. 3 2
Child abuse is generally defined as "the physical, sexual, or emotional
mistreatment of a child." 3 3 Generally, "'neglect' implies a failure to
provide for a child's basic needs for food, education, health care, or safe
shelter." 34 When neglect or abuse is suspected, state-governed protection
23. BAKER& SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 102.

24. In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246, 250 (N.C. 1984) (quoting N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 7A-289.22(1) (1983) (repealed 1999)).
25. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring); Wilson v. Wilson, 153 S.E.2d
349, 351 (N.C. 1967).
26. Wilson, 153 S.E.2d at 351.
27. See Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1923); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the Compulsory Education Act
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children . . ."). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional protections
for a parent to choose how to raise his/her child in conflict with a state's education laws,
exercised through general police power. Id.
28. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (discussing the "best interest of the child" standard).
29. Adams v. Tessener, 550 S.E.2d 499, 502 (N.C. 2001).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(9) (2015) (defining a dependent juvenile as "[a] juvenile
in need of assistance or placement because (i) the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or
custodian responsible for the juvenile's care or supervision or (ii) the juvenile's parent,
guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the juvenile's care or supervision and lacks
an appropriate alternative child care arrangement").
31. BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 101.

32. Id. at 102.
33. HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A NUT SHELL 192 (5th ed.

2007).
34. Id at 191.
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for the child is usually initiated through a report of neglect or abuse to the
state or an authority of the state. 3 5 All states have mandatory reporting
Some states
laws for individuals in certain capacities or positions.
"require all persons to report suspected abuse or neglect, regardless of
profession." 37 To encourage reporting, Congress passed the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974.38 The Act "requires states to extend
immunity to those who report child abuse 'in good faith."' 39
Thus while the constitutional right to parent is a significant one and is
a protected privacy right, that right is subject to limitations and laws aimed
at ensuring the safety and wellbeing of the child.
B. The ProcedureandAdjudication ofAbuse and Neglect Cases
Governmental interference with the right to parent is not taken lightly.
Several procedural protections have been put in place to ensure that a
parent's right to make decisions regarding his or her child is not
encroached upon in the absence of egregious circumstances. These steps
occur after a report has been made, and include permanency planning
hearings, "reasonable efforts" determinations, cease reunification orders,
and, finally, the termination of parental rights.
i.

Report and Assessment

In North Carolina, the authority to provide care for children who are
neglected or abused is vested in DSS. 40 In North Carolina, a neglected
juvenile is defined as a juvenile who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline; is not provided with necessary medical care; or
lives in an injurious environment.4 1 If there is a report of abuse or neglect,

35. BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 106.

36. Id. at 106 (listing physicians and other health-care providers, teachers, child-care
workers, other educators, and public safety employees as those who may be required to
report abuse or neglect of a child to the state); KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 33, at 192
(listing physicians, nurses, teachers, social workers, and other designated mandatory
reporters as those who may be required to report).
37. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 20, at 3, 5-91.
38. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974); see also BAKER& SILBAUGH, supranote 15, at 106.
39. BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 106.
40. See KELLA W. HATCHER ET AL., ABUSE, NEGLECT, DEPENDENCY, AND TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS IN NORTH CAROLINA 2-11 (2015); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-108A-1 (2015).
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(15) (2015). Specifically, a neglected juvenile is
defined in the following way:

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss2/4
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DSS makes an assessment 42 to determine if there is actually abuse or
neglect and whether the protective services of the state should be
provided.4 3
ii.

Permanency PlanningHearing

Once a child is adjudicated as neglected or abused, the juvenile may
be placed in nonsecure custody.4 4 Nonsecure custody is "the placement of
a juvenile without restriction on the juvenile's freedom of movement in the
custody of the [DSS] or [in the custody of] a person designated by the

A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the
juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned;
or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary
remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare;
or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law. In determining
whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile, it is relevant whether that juvenile lives
in a home where another juvenile has died as a result of suspected abuse or
neglect or lives in a home where another juvenile has been subjected to abuse or
neglect by an adult who regularly lives in the home.
Id. Furthermore, serious neglect is defined as "[c]onduct, behavior, or inaction of the
juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker that evidences a disregard of
consequences of such magnitude that the conduct, behavior, or inaction constitutes an
unequivocal danger to the juvenile's health, welfare, or safety, but does not constitute
abuse." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(19a).
42. After receiving a report, DSS determines "whether the facts as stated by the reporter
[of child abuse or neglect], if true, fit within the definition of abuse, neglect, or dependency
in G.S. 7B-101." HATCHER ET AL., supra note 40, at 5-4. If the report "fits the legal
definition of abuse, neglect, or dependency, DSS must conduct an assessment to ascertain
the facts of the case, the extent of any abuse or neglect, and the risk of harm to the juvenile."
Id. at 5-6 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-302 (2015)). There are two types of assessments:
investigative assessments and family assessments. Id. Investigative assessments are
used for reports containing allegations meeting the statutory definitions of abuse
and serious neglect or for reports concerning a child in the custody of a local DSS,
family foster home, residential facility, or child care facility. This type of
response uses a formal information gathering process to determine whether a
juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent.
Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(11 b)).
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-302(a).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-505(a) (2015) (explaining that "[a] juvenile ... may be
placed in nonsecure custody with the department of social services or a person designated in
the order for temporary residential placement in: (1) [a] licensed foster home or a home
otherwise authorized by law to provide such care; or (2) [a] facility operated by the
department of social services; or (3) [a]ny other home or facility, including a relative's
home approved by the court and designated in the order").
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court." 45 After being placed in nonsecure custody, the court must conduct a

hearing and enter a permanency planning order.46 The first hearing must
occur within ninety days from the date of the initial hearing, and the court
must conduct a review hearing within six months of the first hearing. 47 The
first hearing does not have to be designated as a permanency planning
hearing, but a designated permanency planning hearing must occur within
twelve months after the initial order. 4 8 Any hearing after the first
designated "permanency planning hearing" is referred to as a "subsequent
permanency planning hearing". 4 9 A subsequent permanency planning
hearing must occur every six months thereafter.o
"The purpose of a permanency planning hearing is 'to develop a plan
to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable
period of time."'5 ' At the permanency planning hearing, 52 the court tries to
determine what the best plan of care is for the juvenile. Specifically, the
court considers: services which have been offered to reunite the juvenile
with the parent; if the juvenile resided with the parent at the time of
removal; if the parent has participated in visitation time; if reunification
efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the juvenile's safety and need
for a safe, permanent home; the age of the juvenile; as well as other
factors.54 If the juvenile is not currently placed with a parent, the court will
also consider and make any relevant findings concerning: whether
reunification with the parent in the next six months is possible and in the
best interest of the juvenile; if there is other suitable guardianship or
custody available; if adoption should be pursued; and any other criteria the
court deems necessary.55

45. NEWMAN ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA JUVENILE DEFENDER MANUAL 126 (2008),
http://defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/sites/defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/files/pdf/JuvenileDe
fBook_08 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJG7-48WE].
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1(a) (2015).
47. Id.
48. Id
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. In re Weiler, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-907(a) (2001)).
52. A permanency planning hearing is sometimes referred to as a "permanency
planning review". See In re J.V., 679 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1 (2015).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1(d).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1(e).
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Typically in reunification plans, DSS schedules different classes
focused on improving parenting skills, 5 6 provides counseling for the parent,
or requires certain improvements in the parent's employment status or
living situation.5 For example, in In re J V, respondent father's case plan
included requirements to attend parenting classes, learn alternative means
of discipline, and attend domestic violence counseling.58 In a similar
situation, in In re L.B., 59 respondent mother was "required to complete
individual therapy, attend anger management, complete a psychological
evaluation, maintain stable housing, and maintain employment." 6 0
Likewise, in In re Becker,61 respondent parents entered into contracts with
DSS, in which, the parents "agreed to maintain schooling or employment,
pay support for the children, obtain individual counseling, refrain from
illegal activities, and obtain suitable housing for the children." 62
iii.

"ReasonableEfforts" Determination

During the permanency planning hearings, courts look for "reasonable
efforts,'63 pursuant to section 7B-507, made by the parent for the return of
the child.64 Within the inquiry into reasonable efforts, the court also
analyzes the efforts made by the parent and whether the efforts have
resulted in a positive result in the relationship between the parent and

56. DSS schedules classes for parents such as drug counseling classes, parenting
classes, anger management classes, alcohol management classes, religious classes, etc. See
HATCHER ET AL., supra note 40, at 7-25 to 7-26.

57. See In re J.V., 679 S.E.2d at 844.
58. Id.
59. In re L.B. 639 S.E.2d 23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
60. Id. at 26.
61. In re Becker, 431 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct, App. 1993).
62. Id. at 823.
63. In some cases, "reasonable efforts" is referred to as "reasonable progress". See
generallyIn re Pierce, 565 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. 2002).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1 (2015). Reasonable
efforts is defined as follows:
The diligent use of preventive or reunification services by a department of social
services when a juvenile's remaining at home or returning home is consistent with
achieving a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of
time. If a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the juvenile is not to be
returned home, then reasonable efforts means the diligent and timely use of
permanency planning services by a department of social services to develop and
implement a permanent plan for the juvenile.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(18) (2015).
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child. 6 5 A "positive result" 66 is evidenced by an overall positive response

'

to and reasonable progress of the efforts of the parent. This requirement
is necessary so a parent does not make sporadic efforts towards
reunification without actually improving the relationship with the child.68
The determination of reasonable efforts is a fact determinant
case-by-case analysis. In one case, a respondent father did not make
reasonable efforts when he "failed to pay child support during the six
months prior to the filing of the termination petition and to participate in
counseling and attend any permanency planning seminars." 69 In another
instance, respondent parents failed to make the necessary reasonable efforts
when they did not improve their parenting skills, did not engage in
treatment services, denied responsibility for the injuries of a child, failed to
cooperate with family service plans, and failed to attend counseling or
therapy.70 In contrast, a respondent mother did make reasonable efforts
when she cooperated with DSS, attended counseling, attended nurturing
classes, regularly paid child support, established an independent residence,
and regularly visited with the child.7
It is not often that the "reasonable efforts" determination is so clear
cut. In a much closer case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the
findings of fact were sufficient in the permanency planning order to cease
reunification efforts.72 In In re N.D.S., respondent mother did show
progress by completing anger management classes, obtaining a
psychological exam, and working two part-time jobs. However, she was
still unable to control her anger and put others in fear of violence, did not
comply with the recommendations following the psychological evaluation,
and did not obtain housing suitable for her child.74 The court recognized
the respondent mother's progress, but upheld the trial court's finding that
reunification efforts "would be futile or inconsistent with [child's] safety
65. In re Nolen, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (citing In re Tate, 312
S.E.2d 535, 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
66. Courts use "reasonable efforts" and "positive response" while addressing the
requirements of the parent. Id. "Reasonable efforts" are required by section 7B-507, and
the courts will also look for a positive response to the parent by the juvenile. Id.
67. In re Bishop, 375 S.E.2d 676, 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Tate, 312 S.E.2d at
539).
68. Id
69. In re Becker, 431 S.E.2d 820, 825-26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
70. See In re N.G., 650 S.E.2d 45, 48 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
71. See In re Eckard, 547 S.E.2d 835, 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
72. In re N.D.S., No. COA14-826, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1386, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App.
2014).
73. Id. at *5-*6.
74. Id.
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and need for a safe home within a reasonable time." 75 Another close case
was In re D.C., 76 where the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the trial
court's order did not contain sufficient findings of fact to meet the
requirements of section 7B-507(b)(1). 77 Respondent mother enrolled in
college classes, completed parent-child therapy, visited her child weekly,
and regularly attended substance abuse treatment. However, the general
findings by the trial court showed a lack of complete compliance with the
drug treatment program. 7 9 The court held the permanency planning order,
on its own, did not contain sufficient findings of fact to justify ceasing
reunification efforts.8 0
iv. Cessation ofReunification Efforts

Until the court specifically states otherwise, the ultimate goal during
the time period between removal and a cease reunification order is
reunification of the juvenile with the parent.8 ' However, if the parent does
not make sufficient reasonable efforts, the court may enter a permanency
planning order, which ends the efforts of DSS and the court system to
reunite the child and parent. 8 2 The permanency planning order ceasing
reunification efforts is a permanency planning order, but is referred to as a
cease reunification order.83 A cease reunification order can be entered
when the trial court finds facts that support its conclusion to cease
reunification efforts. 84 Specifically, the trial court may make "a finding
that further efforts 'would be futile or would be inconsistent with the
juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a
reasonable period of time ....
75. Id. at *6.
76. In re D.C., 763 S.E.2d 314 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
77. Id. at 316-17.
78. Id. at 317.
79. Id. at 316-17.
80. Id. However, due to the holding in In re L.MT, A.M.T.-which this Comment
addresses in detail-the court of appeals read the cease reunification efforts order with the
termination of parental rights order and thus held the findings for cease reunification efforts
were sufficient. Id. at 317-18; see generally In re L.M.T., A.M.T., 752 S.E.2d 453 (N.C.
2013).
81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(18) (2015).
82. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(18); see also L.M.T.,
752 S.E.2d at 456.
83. See L.MT., 752 S.E.2d at 456.
84. In re C.M., 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting In re Weiler, 581
S.E.2d 134, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
85. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2005)). Another way by which a
court may cease reunification efforts is if a "court of competent jurisdiction has
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Termination ofParentalRights Process

If reunification efforts are ceased, the next step, the next step in the
process is terminating parental rights. 6
The process of terminating
parental rights consists of two phases. 8 7 First, "[i]n the adjudicatory stage,
the petitioner has the burden of establishing by clear[, cogent,] and
convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds [listed supra]
exists." 88 The second stage, the disposition stage, requires the court to
consider whether terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the
child.89 Unless terminating parental rights is not in the best interests of the
child, the court is required to enter an order terminating the rights of the
parent. 90 The most common reason for the termination of parental rights is
failure to make sufficient progress towards rehabilitation. 91 However,
section 7B-1111 lists all the grounds for terminating parental rights,
ranging from murder to failure to pay custody costs. 92
If the court enters a termination order, all rights and obligations due to
the child from the parents are severed, and the parent "no longer ha[s] any

.

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the parent to another child of the parent
Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507(b)(3) (2005)).
86. See N. C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., GUARDIAN AD LITEM ATTORNEY PRACTICE
MANUAL 144 (2007), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/Gal/Documents/Manual/chapter04.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6E6R-A2UQ]. The motion for termination of parental rights may be
filed by, among others, a parent seeking the termination of the other parent's rights, a county
DSS, a licensed child-placing agency with custody of the child, or a person with whom the
child has lived continuously for the two years preceding the petition. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B- 103(a) (2015).
87. See In re Anderson, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re
Blackburn, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B- 110(a) (2001)).
91. BAKER & SILBAUGH, supra note 15, at 177.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-111 1(a)(1I)-(0) (2015) (listing as grounds for termination of
parental rights: the parent has abused or neglected the juvenile; the parent willfully left the
juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months; the

parent failed to pay for a reasonable portion of custody costs; probability that the parent will
continue to be incapable to care for the juvenile; the parent willfully abandoned the juvenile
for at least six consecutive months; the parent has committed murder or voluntary
manslaughter of another child of the parent or other child residing in the home, or other
crimes concerning homicide; parental rights have been terminated concerning another child;

where the juvenile has been relinquished to a county DSS or a license child placing agency
for the purpose of adoption or placed with a prospective adoptive parent; and if the parent
has been convicted of a sexual related offense that resulted in the conception of the
juvenile).
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constitutionally protected interest in [his or her] child[]." 93 Furthermore,
the parent is no longer considered a party to the proceedings and may not
object or participate in the proceedings.94 Because the termination of
parental rights results in a harsh severance of the juvenile and parent
relationship, the burden of proof for a termination of parental rights order is
96
After the order terminating parental
clear 95 and convincing evidence.
97
rights, section 7B-908 controls the case. 98
II. INREL.MT., A.MT. AND THE INTERSECTION OF PERMANENCY
PLANNING AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ORDERS

The case that brought the relationship between permanency planning
orders and termination of parental rights orders into the spotlight was In re
L.MT., A.MT. 99 In L.MT, the findings at the trial court tended to show
the respondent mother's children, L.M.T. ("Linda") and A.M.T.
("Andrew"), 0 0 were neglected.' 0' The trial court found respondent mother
had a history of drug use, unemployment, and mental instability.1 02
Further, respondent mother frequently left Linda and Andrew with various
caretakers, instead of providing the majority of care for her two children.' 0 3

93. In re Montgomery, 336 S.E.2d 136, 138 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); N. C.

ADMIN. OFF.

OF THE CTS., supra note 86, at 186-87.
94. N. C. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., supra note 86, at 186-87.
95. Some courts define the standard as "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence," but
the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" is the same as "clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence." The courts use the two phrases interchangeably. See In re Baker,

581 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
96. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as "a higher standard than
preponderance of the evidence, but not as stringent as the requirement of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting In re Hardesty, 563 S.E.2d 79, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-908 (2015) (titled "Post termination of parental rights'
placement court review").
98. See id The court must conduct a placement review no more than six months after
the termination of parental rights. See id § 7B-908(b). "The purpose of each placement

review is to ensure that every reasonable effort is being made to provide for a permanent
placement plan for the juvenile who has been placed in the custody of a county director or

licensed child-placing agency, which is consistent with the juvenile's best interests." Id.
§ 7B-908(a).
99. In re L.M.T., A.M.T., 752 S.E.2d 453, 458, 461 (N.C. 2013).
100. The pseudonyms "Linda" and "Andrew" were and are being used to protect the

identities of the juveniles. See In re L.M.T., A.M.T., No. COAl2-743, 2012 N.C. App.
LEXIS 1426, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012).
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id. at *2.
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After ordering both Linda and Andrew dependent, 104 but not neglected, the
trial court established "a permanent plan of reunification with respondent
and ordered DSS to continue to make reasonable efforts toward
reunification.' 0 o For ten months the ultimate goal remained to reunite
Linda and Andrew with respondent mother. 06 However, in October 2010,
the trial court, upon noticing a lack of reasonable efforts by respondent
mother, changed the ultimate goal from reunification with respondent
mother to "placement with court-approved caretakers and a concurrent plan
of adoption... ."107 Further, DSS was relieved from
making any
additional efforts with respondent mother towards reunification.'"
Respondent mother objected to the cease reunification efforts order.1 09
Following the order ceasing reunification efforts between respondent
mother and Linda and Andrew, DSS filed a petition for an order
terminating respondent mother's parental rights." 0 The trial court granted
the petition and entered an order terminating respondent mother's parental
rights."'
Then, respondent mother gave notice of appeal from the
termination of parental rights order."12
On appeal at the North Carolina Court of Appeals, respondent mother
argued the trial court failed to make "sufficient findings to cease
reunification efforts pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. [section] 7B-507(b)" in the
permanency planning order." 3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
agreed with respondent mother that the permanency planning order was
deficient and, accordingly, reversed and remanded the case."1 4 Specifically,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals highlighted that although the trial
court made findings of fact about respondent mother's "troubled case

104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(9) (2015) (defining a dependent juvenile as "[a] juvenile
in need of assistance or placement because (i) the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or
custodian responsible for the juvenile's care or supervision or (ii) the juvenile's parent,
guardian, or custodian is unavailable to provide for the juvenile's care or supervision and
lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement").
105. In re L.MT., 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1426, at *2.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *3.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *3.
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history", the trial court did not link the facts to the specific requirements
mandated by statute." 5
On appeal at the North Carolina Supreme Court, the court agreed that
the permanency planning order was sufficient because the specific
language in section 7B-507(b) is not required to satisfy the statutory
requirements.l16 Unlike the court of appeals, which required a link between
the facts of the case and the factors listed in section 7B-507(b), the supreme
court only required the trial court to make clear the evidence showed
reunification between the juveniles and parent(s) would be futile.117
Particularly, the supreme court stated the statute did not require a "verbatim
recitation of its language", although that is usually the best practice for a
trial court." 8 The supreme court then reviewed the permanency planning
order in respondent mother's case and found, without requiring the exact
language of the statute, the evidence showed reunification efforts by DSS
and respondent mother would be ineffective. 19
The justices, however, disagreed about the relationship between a
permanency planning order and a subsequent termination of parental rights
order when reviewed by an appellate court.1 20 The majority opinion held
that a subsequent order terminating the parental rights can cure a prior
permanency planning order that is deficient due to a lack of sufficient
findings of fact in conjunction with section 7B-507(b) factors.' 2
Accordingly, that ensuing finding would "legitimize" the permanency
planning order.' 22

115. Id. at *6. The court of appeals required an explicit link between findings of fact and
factors listed in section 7B-507(b). Id. The factors listed in section 7B-507(b) are to be
considered when determining whether reunification efforts should be ceased and are: if
efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe,
permanent home within a reasonable period of time; it has been determines that the parent
has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances; a court has terminated involuntarily the
parental rights of the parent to another child of the parent; or if a court has determined that
the parent has committed murder of voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent,
or other certain acts associated with homicide. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507(b) (2015).
116. See In re L.M.T., A.M.T., 752 S.E.2d 453, 458, 461 (N.C. 2013).
117. Id. at 456.
118. Id. at 455.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 456, 461-62.
121. Id. at 456-57.
122. Id. The majority opinion relied on a reading of section 7B-1001(a)(5)(a) of the
North Carolina General Statutes:
The Court of Appeals shall review [an] order [entered under section 7B-507] to
cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights
order if all of the following apply:
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF L.M T. AND THE ARGUMENT FOR SUPERSEDING
ITS HOLDING

In L.MT, the North Carolina Supreme Court struggled to balance the
constitutional rights of parents and what is best for the child.1 2 3 In an effort
to further the General Assembly and Juvenile Code's purposes, the
majority and concurring justices did not require recitation of the statute
requiring reasonable efforts, and, instead, held the findings of fact and
instead held the findings of fact to be sufficient for the statute.1 24
The majority further held a subsequent termination of parental rights
order can cure a prior deficient order.' 25 Specifically, "incomplete findings
of fact in the cease reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in
the termination order." 26 There are two major advantages of allowing a
subsequent termination of parental rights order to cure a permanency
planning order. First, subsequent curing by a permanency planning order
will expedite the removal of children from abusive or neglectful
environments. Second, courts are assured that a lack of findings of facts in
a permanency planning order will not usurp progress towards termination
of parental rights.
i.

The Benefits of Simultaneous Review: Expedited Removal andJudicial
Efficiency

First, the efficiency of reading both orders together results in an
expedited removal of children from an abusive or neglectful environment.
In some permanency planning orders, a child may have visitation at the
parental home or return to the parent's home for an intermediate, trial
period.1 27 If the court continues this custody plan during the permanency
planning hearing period, the child may be exposed to a situation that is
abusive or neglectful. However, if the permanency planning order is

1. A motion or petition to terminate the parent's rights is heard and granted.
2. The order terminating parental rights is appealed in a proper and timely
manner.
3. The order to cease reunification is identified as an issue in the record on
appeal of the termination of parental rights.
Id. at 456 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1001(a)(5)(a) (2011)).
123. Id. at 454-55.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 454.
126. Id. at 457.
127. See In re J.C.S.; & R.D.S., 595 S.E.2d 155, 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by
In re R.T.W., 614 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 2005); see also In re J.V., 679 S.E.2d 843, 843 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009).
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merged with the termination of parental rights order, the parent would have
no rights to the child, and since there may not be an intermediate, trial
period, the child's risk of being exposed to abuse or neglect is
eliminated. 128 In that sense, the current procedural delay of appealing the
orders separately thwarts court action in the best interest of the child, and a
merged review may prevent these issues.
Moreover, the efficiency of allowing a merged review aids the effort
to provide the juvenile with a permanent plan as soon as possible and
advances the aim of the Juvenile Code: "to provide for the 'best interests of
the juvenile' within a 'reasonable amount of time."'l 29 Although appeals
involving juveniles are "fast-tracked," the process of appealing to the court
of appeals may take up to eighteen months.1 3 0 Additionally, the time
period would be further extended if the order were appealed to the supreme
court.', During this prolonged process, a juvenile may remain in
nonsecure custody or in the custody designated in the permanent plan; this
leaves the juvenile's future placement uncertain during the appeal.
Depending on the outcome of the appeal, a juvenile may then be shifted,
again, from a permanent plan to nonsecure custody or remain in nonsecure
custody with an unsure future.
Further, the permanency planning orders do not provide the juvenile
with finality in their situation.' 32 For example, a permanency planning
order can vary from remaining in nonsecure custody, permitting visitation
time with the parent(s), or staying temporarily at the parental home. 3 3
However, a termination of parental rights order provides finality to the
juvenile because after termination, the court must soon thereafter provide
the juvenile with a permanent placement plan.' 34

128. See In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251-52 (N.C. 1984); N. C. ADMIN.

OFF. OF

THE CTS., supra note 86, at 186-87.

129. In re L.MT., 752 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-100(5) (2011)).
130.

See OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., THE N.C. COURT SYS., QUESTIONS AND

ANSWERS ABOUT YOUR APPEAL AND YOUR LAWYER 6 (2010) (estimating that the record

takes at least four to six months, briefing takes three or four months, the court of appeals
may take six months or longer to schedule to decide if there will be oral arguments for the
case and two to six months after oral arguments for a decision), http://www.ncids.org/Rule
s%20&%20Procedures/Policies%2OBy%2OCase%20Type/Non-Cap-Non-CriminalAppeals/
AppellateGuideEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KLD-AL3P].
131. Id.
132. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-908(b) (2015) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1(a)
(2015).
133. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-505(a) (2015); see also NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 45,
at 126.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-908(a)-(b).
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By allowing a termination of parental rights order to cure a deficient
permanency planning order, courts reduce the risk of children being
exposed to abusive or neglectful environments, provide the juvenile with a
permanent plan as quickly as possible, and provide finality for the juvenile.
The efficiency of reading both orders together and allowing the subsequent
order to cure the prior order results in an overall expedited removal of
children from abusive or neglectful environments.
Beyond the benefits to the child, allowing a permanency planning
order to be read with a termination of parental rights order helps the DSS
and trial court function with more ease. In some prior cases, a failure to
establish a finding of fact at the trial court level showing reunification
efforts would be futile invalidated the permanency planning order.1 35 Due
to this misstep, a parent could appeal from the cease reunification order.1 3 6
However, if the finding of fact can be subsequently established in a
termination of parental rights order, the misstep does not result in the
parent's ability to reestablish reunification efforts or parental rights.13 7
Before L.M T, if a trial court failed to make the requisite findings in a
permanency planning order, the court did not have the opportunity to
correct its failure in a later order. Instead, the court would have to return to
the permanency planning order stage in the removal process. However,
because of the holding in L.M. T, the misstep of not establishing all
necessary findings of fact in a permanency planning order no longer results
in such harsh-and judicially inefficient-ramifications. 138
In conclusion, the majority holding in L.MT. instructed the appellate
courts to read the permanency planning order and termination of parental
rights order together. 13 9 The reasoning behind the majority's decision was
to further the purpose of the Juvenile Code, remove children from abusive
or neglectful homes, and provide a permanent plan for juveniles within a
reasonable time. Further, this approach helps the courts function with more
ease when ordering permanency plans by assuring that a lack of findings of
facts will not usurp the progress towards termination of parental rights.
Thus, this result is both in the best interest of the child and furthers the
efficiency of the court system.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See In re Eckard, 547 S.E.2d 835, 838 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
See In re L.M.T., A.M.T., 752 S.E.2d 453, 453 (N.C. 2013).
See id.
Id. at 456-57.
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The Disadvantagesof Simultaneous Review: ParentalProcedural
Protectionand the PermanencyPlanningOrder

The appellate courts' practice of reviewing the permanency planning
and termination of parental rights orders together results in several
significant disadvantages, as well. The combined reading of the two orders
results in (1) a lack of procedural protection for the respondent parent; and
(2) the undermining of the importance of a permanency planning order.
The first consequence of reviewing a permanency planning order in
conjunction with a termination of parental rights order is that the procedure
cuts off a parent's rights at a time when parents need more procedural
protection and, thus, results in a loss of an opportunity to appeal.1 4 0
Although the instinctual reaction in cases involving abuse and neglect is
only to establish, recognize, and analyze the procedural protection for
juveniles, parents should still be afforded procedural safeguards.1 4 1 "The
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State." 4 2
Further, the United States Supreme Court stressed the
importance of "fundamentally fair procedures" and a "critical need for
procedural protections" when a parent is fighting to retain the family
unit. 143 By requiring the reading of the two orders together, there is a lack
of procedural protection for a respondent parent.1 44
Prior to L.MT., procedural protection for the parent during this period
of permanency planning hearings came in the form of allowing a parent to
appeal from each order filed against him or her. In L.M T.'s aftermath,
instead of procedural protection, the mingled reading of the two orders
results in exposure to procedural unfairness. The simultaneous review
process eradicates one of the respondent parent's appeals. Before L.MT., a
parent was allowed to appeal both a deficient permanency planning order,
or, specifically, a cease reunification order, and the termination of parental
rights order.1 4 5 On appeal, the permanency planning order was viewed on
its own, and the appellate court would determine if the findings of fact

140. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 753.
143. Id. at 753-54 ("If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened
familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.").
144. See id.; see also In re L.MT., 752 S.E.2d at 462-64.
145. See supra Part II.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2016

19

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4

260

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:241

showed reunification between the respondent parent and juvenile would be
futile. If the permanency planning order contained insufficient findings,
the appellate court would reverse the trial court's order. Further, the parent
appealing from an order terminating parental rights could argue that there
was insufficient evidence to support the decision.146 Likewise, if the
subsequent order terminating parental rights lacked sufficient findings, the
trial court would reinstate the parent's rights.
However, the approach supported by the majority opinion in L.M.T.
essentially merges the permanency planning order and termination of
parental rights order together.1 47 Instead of both the permanency planning
and termination of parental rights orders being reviewed independently, the
findings in a subsequent termination of parental rights order can "cure" a
deficient permanency planning order. 14 8 Consequently, as highlighted in
the concurring opinion, this approach bypasses one of the parent's appeals.
Instead of a respondent parent being afforded an unabridged appellate
process for each order filed against him or her, the orders are read together,
and there are no independent findings.
Rather than performing a simultaneous review, allowing a prior order
to be admitted for consideration during review of a subsequent order does
not abridge a respondent parent's right to appeal. A respondent parent
would have the opportunity to appeal both the first order and any
subsequent order. Further, the admittance and consideration of prior
established facts does not result in the same backwards "curing" effect that
was established in the majority opinion of L.M T1 49 Although a prior order
can be admitted for consideration for a subsequent order, the reverse
method abridges the right to appeal and does not require independent
findings for each order. The holding in L.M T. allows findings from
another order to be determinative for the order under review. 50 This is
inappropriate given the recognized procedural rights of parents that attempt
to maintain the family unit. L.MT.'s "curing" effect unfairly dismisses
parental procedural rights to appeal deficient orders and has
devastating-and dispositive-impacts on the relationship between a
parent and a child.
In addition to the procedural concern for parents, the reading of the
orders together undermines the role of a permanency planning order.' 5 If a

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See In re Nolen, 453 S.E.2d 220, 223 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
See In re L.M T., 752 S.E.2d at 454, 456-57.
See id
Id. at 454.
See id. at 454, 456-57.
See id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss2/4

20

Maywalt: The Implications of In Re L.M.T.: A Call to the North Carolina Ge

2016]

THE IMPLICATIONS OFINREL.MT.

2
261

deficient order can be cured later, the requirements for a permanency
planning order are essentially considered moot.1 52
Before L.MT., a
permanency planning order had to withstand appellate review on its own
findings.153 Therefore, the findings in a permanency planning order had to
be sufficient enough to sustain the permanent plan set by the lower court or
to support the trial court's finding that ceasing reunification efforts was
proper.1 5 4 However, with the combination of the two orders, any finding
absent in the permanency planning order can be included in a termination
of parental rights order. 155 This method undermines the importance and
value of a permanency planning order.
iii. The Future ofSimultaneous Review: Why L.M.T. Should Be
Superseded by Statute
In light of these significant concerns, the courts should respect the
differences in the two orders and acknowledge that each order should be
able to stand on its own grounds, instead of relying on findings from other
orders.1 5 6 In In re Stewart Children,'5 7 the court of appeals was presented
with multiple orders terminating respondent parents' parental rights.' 5 8 In
regard to the first order terminating parental rights, the district court found
the first phase-a statutory ground for termination existed-of the
two-phase test as satisfied.' 59 However, the second phase-a showing that
termination would not be in the best interests of the child-of the test was
not satisfied.1 6 0 The district court found that termination of parental rights
was not in the best interest of the child.161 Two years later, the termination

152. See id.
153. See In re L.M.T., A.M.T., No. COAl2-743, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1426, at *1
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012). There, the Court did not read the permanency planning and
termination of parental rights orders together; instead, because the court found the
permanency planning order to be deficient on its own face, the order was not proper. Id.
154. See id.
155. See In re L.MT., 752 S.E.2d at 454, 456-57.
156. In re Stewart, 347 S.E.2d 495, 497 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
157. Id.
158. Id
159. Id. Grounds for termination existed. See id; see also In re Anderson, 564 S.E.2d
599, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re Blackburn, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001)). The Court explained the process of terminating parental rights consists of two
phases. Id. In the first phase, one of the grounds for terminated listed in the relevant statute
must exist. Id For the second phase, the court must decide whether termination is in the
best interests of the child. Id.
160. In re Stewart, 347 S.E.2d at 497.
16 1. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2016

21

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

262

[Vol. 38:241

of parental rights order1 62 was filed against respondent mother.' 63 While
reviewing the second set of termination orders, the court of appeals
admitted and considered a prior order that adjudicated a parent of
neglect.164 In the first termination of parental rights order, respondent
mother was adjudicated of neglect, but termination was not proper.16 5
However, the court still required independent findings of the requisite facts
for the subsequent orders.1 6 6
By previously requiring independent findings of facts and giving due
weight to the two separate orders, the courts recognized the procedural
rights of parents and the importance of the permanency planning order,
even if it came at the cost of judicial efficiency. If the end goal is to
remove children from abusive and neglectful environments as quickly as
possible, the courts should consider alternatives that do not infringe on the
procedural rights of parents or create shortcuts when a fundamental right is
at stake. In fact, alternatives are already in place to ensure the safety of
children: the removal of children from abusive or neglectful homes can be
achieved through the expedited procedures for juvenile cases in the court
system.1 67 The General Assembly and court system have already taken the
need for an expedited process into consideration and provided a specific,
accelerated process for juveniles in the DSS system.' 6 8 With an expedited
system in place, it is unnecessary for the court to make further
accommodations in the name of expedited removal.
Because parental procedural and fundamental privacy rights are
stake-and the safe removal of children is already provided for
elsewhere-the North Carolina General Assembly should consider the
ramifications of L.M T. and overrule its decision.
IV. CONCLUSION

The legal system in North Carolina has, and should have, an interest in
protecting juveniles who are abused, neglected, or abandoned. However,

162.
mother.
163.
164.
165.

Three terminations of parental orders were filed, one for each child of respondent
See id
Id.
Id.
Id.

166. Id.
167. See OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., supra note 130, at 6.
168. Id. (estimating that the record takes at least four to six months, briefing takes three
or four months, the court of appeals may take six months or longer to schedule to decide if
there will be oral arguments for the case and two to six months after oral arguments for a
decision).
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the line between the desire to protect juveniles and invading a parent's right
is very fine.
Ultimately, a termination of parental rights order should not be
allowed to cure a deficient permanency planning order. The role of curing
is not appropriate for a termination of parental rights order because the
procedure results in (1) a lack of procedural protection for the respondent
parent, resulting in the loss of the respondent parent's right to appeal; and
(2) the undermining of a permanency planning order's importance.
Moreover, reinstating the parent's right to appeal a deficient permanency
planning order furthers the intent of the legislature.' 69
The benefits of L.M T.'s holding do not outweigh its detriments. As
explained above, the rationale behind L.MT's holding was to expedite the
removal of children from abusive or neglectful environments.
Additionally, its simultaneous review provided courts with the assurance
that lack of findings of facts in a permanency planning order would not
usurp progress towards termination of parental rights.1 70 However, there
are less problematic ways to achieve the same result.
Additionally, the expedited removal is not a significant enough reason
to abridge a parent's constitutional right. Although the instinctual reaction
is to consider only the procedural protections for juveniles, parents should
still be afforded procedural safeguards.' 7 ' Further, because the right to
parent is so intensely guarded from state intrusion, this right should not
have been abridged by the North Carolina courts.
Finally, allowing a subsequent termination of parental rights order to
cure a prior, deficient permanency planning order undermines the
importance of a permanency planning order. The General Assembly has
extensively laid out the requirements for permanency planning orders;1 72
however, these requirements are in vain if a deficient permanency planning
order can be subsequently cured. As it stands, there is no need to list
requirements or offer findings of fact if those standards are not actually
required.
In conclusion, the North Carolina General Assembly should revise
7B-1001(a)(5)(a) and, in effect, supersede the holding of L.MT. In its
revision, the General Assembly should reinstate a parent's right to appeal
both a permanency planning order and a termination of parental rights
order and direct appellate courts to review the orders separately. This
revision would reinstate parental rights in the complicated process of

169. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1001(a)(5)(a) (2015).
170.

See supra Part II.

171. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 1982).
172. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 7B-507

(2015).
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reunification and termination between parents and children and strengthen
the importance of permanency planning orders.
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